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JURISDICTION
Rp««P" »nrjoi i \A 'orkers Compensation Fund of Utah (the """Fund") and
Samuel Mclntyre Investment Co. (the "Employer") agree with and adopl 11 u
statement of jurisdictioii
Jereasp-I

i

widow of the

, I IM Greqnry I. Ulsun '"' Msun ) regarding Petitioner's appeal from a

decision of Industrial Commission of Utah (the "Commissioi i").

. nursTioNS
A.

PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

First Issue: The following issu*

preserved before the

Commission. See Defendants" Memoraru

>• "

"" i"1?

"Tr'< ord at

Whether the Industrial Commission of Utah correctly
decided that Olsen was excluded from workers
compensation coverage when it concluded the Employer
was required to give only one written notice to the Fund
and the Commission to satisfy the notice provisions of
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 (3)(b).
btandard of Review:

I ho > in i . IHPSS siai laid is applied to

* oecific law for whit
'

e-xLiitidiscretie

'""'" Code

A

~~

; r juency has not been granted implicit

*

*

l t d 4 )(< :!); MUCUI i..mu M State

i ax

Comm i
B.

Second Issue:

The following issue was presented to the Commission

by Respondent. See Defendants

jthorities, Record

Whether, in the alternative, the revised notice provisions
of Utah Code Ann § 35-1-43(4) which eliminated any
i

requirement to give notice to the Commission should be
applied retroactively to deny Petitioner's claims.

Standard of Review:

The correction of error standard is applied to agency

interpretations of general law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d); Zissi v. Tax
Comm'n, 8 4 2 P.2d 8 4 8 , 8 5 2 - 5 3 & n. 2 (Utah 1992).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Interpretation of then Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-43(3)(b) (1993)
and application of the revised version of this statute, now designated as § 3 5 - 1 43(4), are determinative in the case. The 1993 version read as follows:
A corporation may elect to not include any director or
officer of the corporation as an employee under this
Chapter. If a corporation makes this election, it shall
serve written notice upon its insurance carrier and upon
the Commission naming the persons to be excluded from
coverage. A director or officer of a corporation is
considered an employee under this Chapter until the
notice has been given. (Emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3)(b)(1993).
The 1 995 revision of this statute reads as follows:
A corporation may elect not to include any director or
officer of the corporation as an employee under this
Chapter. If a corporation makes this election, it shall
serve written notice upon its insurance carrier naming the
persons to be excluded from coverage. A director or
officer of a corporation is considered an employee under
this Chapter until the notice has been given. (Emphasis
added).
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(4)(1995).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition.
Applicant and Petitioner, the widow of Olsen, applied for workers

compensation benefits as the surviving spouse of Olsen who died in an auto/train
accident on June 3, 1994. At the time of the accident, Olsen was President of the
Employer. The Fund denied the Applicants' claim for benefits because more than
one year prior to the fatal accident, Olsen, as president of the Employer and
pursuant to U.C.A. § 35-1-43(3), gave the Fund written notice to exclude Olsen as
an employee for workers compensation purposes. Record at p. 66. The Fund then
sent a computer tape as notice of Olsen's exclusion to the Commission as required
by law.

As a result of this notice, the Fund issued a rider to the Employer which

formalized the exclusion of Olsen from coverage under the policy and the Fund
discontinued collecting premiums for Olsen.
On November 16, 1995, Administrative Law Judge Barbara Elicerio
(the "ALJ") ruled that both the Employer and the Fund were liable for paying the
claimed death benefits because Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3)(b) required the
Employer to give separate written notice of the election directly to the Commission
as well at to the Fund. (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order,
Petitioner's "Addendum B,f.)
On November 30, 1995, the Fund and Employer filed a Motion for
Review with the Industrial Commission. On June 10, 1996, the Commission
reversed the ALJ's decision in its Order Granting Motion for Review (the
3

"Commission's Order")(See Addendum C, Petitioner's Brief) and denied Petitioner's
claim for benefits. The Commission concluded that the notice provisions of Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3)(b) had been satisfied by the Employer because the
statutes did not require separate written notice to each the Fund and the
Commission.
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
The following additional facts are included in the Commission's Order:
In a letter dated January 1 , 1992 and signed by Olsen as the Employer's
president, the Employer instructed the Fund as follows: "Please exclude the
undersigned, Gregory J . Olsen, an officer and director of the policy holder, from
further coverage under the policy effective January 1 , 1992 and until further
notice." (Commission's Order, Record at p. 105, See Addendum C, Petitioner's
Brief.) The Fund then mailed the Employer, to Olsen's attention, a form entitled
"Corporate Officer/Director Exclusion Form" which explained that upon receipt by
the Fund of the signed form from the Employers, any officers and directors of the
Employer listed on the form would no longer be employees for purposes of workers'
compensation benefits. (Commission's Order, Record at p. 106.)

On February 3,

1992, the Employer returned the form signed by Olsen as president of the company
and listing Olsen as the only officer/director to be excluded. (Commission's Order,
Record at p. 106.) Although the Employer did not provide separate notice to the
Commission that it had excluded Olsen from coverage, the Fund notified the
Commission "in the usual and customary manner, by means of magnetic tape
4

which was downloaded into the Industrial Commission's records." (Commission's
Order, Record at p. 106.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The notice given by the Employer to exclude Olsen as a covered employee
for workers compensation purposes was effective because either (1) the notice
complied w i t h the provisions of U.C.A. § 35-1-43(b)(3) which does not require
separate notice, or in the alternative (2) the superseding provisions of U.C.A. § 351-43(4) as amended in 1995 should be given retroactive effect as a change in
notice requirements without any change in substantive benefits.
ARGUMENT
I.
OLSEN WAS EXCLUDED AS AN EMPLOYEE FOR PURPOSES OF WORKERS
COMPENSATION BECAUSE THE EMPLOYER GAVE NOTICE TO BOTH THE FUND
AND THE COMMISSION THROUGH THE FUND.
A.

The Employer Was Required to Give Only One Written Notice to Both the
Fund and the Commission.
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides benefits to dependant

survivors of employees covered by the Act who die as a result of an accident
arising out of and in the course of employment. U.C.A. § 35-1-45. Officers and
directors of corporations are covered employees unless the corporation elects to
exclude them as employees by complying with the requirements for opting out of
coverage. At the time of Olsen's accident, these opt out requirements were set
forth in U.C.A. § 35-1-43(3)(b) which read as follows:

5

A corporation may elect to not include any director or
officer of the corporation as an employee under this
Chapter. If a corporation makes this election, it shall
serve written notice upon its insurance carrier and upon
the Commission naming the persons to be excluded from
coverage. A director or officer of a corporation is
considered an employee under this Chapter until the
notice has been given. (Emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3)(b), U.C.A. (1993).

The primary question on appeal

is whether the Employer's written notice to the Fund, which notice the Fund then
transmitted to the Commission as required by law, was effective to exclude Olsen
as an employee for workers' compensation purposes. The Commission decided the
notice was effective because the statute does not require separate notice to each
of the Fund and the Commission.

The position taken by Petitioner, on the other

hand, is that this statute required the Employer to give two written notices, one to
each the Fund and the Commission.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "proper construction of a statute
must further its purposes." RDG Assoc./Jorman Corp. v. Indus. Com'n, 741 P.2d
9 4 8 , 951 (Utah 1987).

And, because a statute is to be construed in light of its

intended purpose, substantial compliance with a notice statute may satisfy the
statutory intent. Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 4 8 0 (1980). The
purpose of a requirement to give notice is for the benefit of the party who is to
receive the notice, not for the benefit of the party giving the notice. Nelson v.
Jacobsen, 6 6 9 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1983). And, effective notice need only "be
of such nature as to reasonably to convey the required information....". kL

6

In this case, there is no dispute that the Employer gave written notice to the
Fund that it elected to have Olsen excluded as an employee for workers1
compensation coverage. Petitioner's Statements of Facts; Record at p. 4 1 . The
Fund responded by cancelling coverage as to Olsen by issuing a rider to the
Employer (General Endorsement, Record at p. 7 1 , See Addendum) and gave notice
to the Commission of the cancellation. ( Affidavit of Brad Christenson, Record at
pp. 37-38.) The Fund and Commission have elected this method of compliance
with U.C.A. § 35-1-43(3)(b) (Commission's Order, Record at 106,) in part because
the Fund is already required to provide exactly the same information to the
Commission, pursuant to U.C.A. §§ 35-1-47 1 and 31A-22-1002 2 , both of which
require notice by the Fund to the Commission of all policy cancellations before such
cancellations are effective. Therefore, by operation of these statutes, the
Commission received the notice required by § 35-1-43(3)(b) through the Fund.

1

Section 35-1-47 (1986) reads in part: (1) Every insurance carrier
writing workers' compensation insurance coverage in this state or for this state, ...
shall file notification of that coverage with the Industrial Commission or its designee
with 30 days after the inception date of the policy on forms prescribed by the
Workers' Compensation Division of the Industrial Commission. These policies will
be in effect from inception until canceled by filing with the commission or its
designee a notification of cancellation on forms prescribed by the Workers'
Compensation Division within ten days after the cancellation of a policy.
2

Section 31 A-22-1002 : (1) Any insurer assuming a workers'
compensation risk shall carry it until the policy is canceled, either:
(a) by agreement between the Industrial Commission, the insurer, and the
employer; or
(b) after 3 0 days notice by the insurer to the employer, and after notice to
the Industrial Commission as provided in Section 35-1-47.
7

Given these facts, the Commission correctly decided that the notice given by
the employer was adequate to exclude Olsen as an employee for purposes of
workers compensation benefits. This well-established method of giving notice to
the Commission meets the purpose of such notice, allowing both the Fund and
Commission to monitor coverage, and to do so without having to create a
bureaucratic procedure of matching separate notices submitted to each entity.
Where a notice requirement is intended to serve as a shield to the Fund and
Commission, it should not now be allowed to serve as a sword against the Fund.
This result cannot have been intended by the Legislature.
B.

Allowing the Employer to Obtain Coverage Without Paving Premiums
Produces an Absurd Result Which Is Ineguitable and Should Be Estopped.
When a strictly literal interpretation of a statute produces results which are

absurd, then the Commission and courts are entitled to narrow the literal scope of
the statute. RDG Assoc./Jorman Corp. v. Indus. Com'n, 741 P.2d 9 4 8 , 951 (Utah
1 987).

Utah law frowns on allowing a party to profit from its o w n mistakes.

Midwest Realty v. City of West Jordan, 541 P.2d 1109 (failure of city to strictly
comply w i t h statute did not excuse city from making payment.)
Utah also recognizes the law of equitable estoppel "which precludes parties
from asserting their fights where their actions render it inequitable to allow them to
assert those rights." Burrow v. Vrontikis, 7 8 8 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Utah App. 1990).
Estoppel requires proof of three elements: (1) an act or statement by one party
inconsistent w i t h a later asserted claim; (2) the other party's reasonable action or
8

inaction based on the first party's action or statement, and (3) injury to the second
party that would result from allowing the first party to repudiate its act or
statement. ]cL
Petitioner's reliance on an Arizona case, Hacker v. Industrial
Commission of Arizona, 758 P.2d 6 6 2 , 157 Ariz. 391 (Arizona App. 1988) is
misplaced. First, the Arizona case does not provide a precedent for Utah. Second,
the issues in the Hacker case are not the same as here. There, the question was
whether the person giving the notice had the capacity to give such notice. That is
not at issue in this case. Pursuant to Arizona statute an employee could make a
pre-injury election of remedies for work related injuries, i.e. receive workers'
compensation or, in the alternative, retain the right to sue the employer. Hacker,
758 P.2d at 664. The insurers raised estoppel and equity arguments that notice
was effective even though the employee did not give the notice.

The Arizona

court rejected these arguments because this election of remedies resulted from a
constitutional amendment which the court found to be an expression of public
policy; and, "no contractual consent, .... no laches nor estoppel can prevail against
public policy. Hacker, 758 P.2d at 6 6 5 , citing Red Rover Copper Co. v. Industrial
Com'n, 58 Ariz. 2 0 3 , 118 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1941).

In this case, there is no such

constitutional mandate barring equitable considerations.
The Arizona court also found that, in addition to giving notice, the statutory
notice formality in the Hacker case may help to protect the employee from his own
improvidence or folly in electing remedies. Hacker, 758 P.2d at 6 6 5 . In the
9

present case, the employer can make the election without any notice or
consideration to the employee, so guarding against improvidence or folly on the
part of the employee cannot be a purpose of the Utah statute. In this case the
notice requirement is strictly for the benefit of the party receiving the notice.
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d at 1212.
Here, the Employer clearly had the burden to give the required notice and
was in the best position to ensure that it complied with any notice requirement.
The Fund was entitled to and did rely on the notice it received by reducing
premiums, issuing an exclusion to coverage and notifying the Commission of the
exclusion. To now allow the Employer in this case to obtain coverage from an
insurer without paying premiums because the Employer itself failed to comply with
a notice requirement imposed on the Employer would produce an absurd and
inequitable result not intended by the Legislature. To rule otherwise would be to
allow the fox to police the henhouse.
II.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE 1995 AMENDMENT TO § 35-1-43(3)(b),
U.C.A.,WHICH ELIMINATED NOTICE TO THE COMMISSION WAS A CHANGE IN A
PROCEDURE AND SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.
In 1995, the legislature amended U.C.A. § 35-1-43(3)(b), now designated
as § 35-1-43(4), to read as follows:
A corporation may elect not to include any director or
officer of the corporation as an employee under this
Chapter. If a corporation makes this election, it shall
serve written notice upon its insurance carrier naming the
persons to be excluded from coverage. A director or
10

officer of a corporation is considered an employee under
this Chapter until the notice has been given. (Emphasis
added).
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(4) U.C.A. (1995).

This amendment was clearly

intended to eliminate the requirement to give notice to the Commission, either
directly or indirectly.

Consequently, Applicant's claim must be denied if the

revised statute is applied retroactively.
The general rule is that revision of a statute "cannot be given retroactive
effect unless the legislature expressly declares such an intent in the statute."
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assoc, 795 P.2d 6 6 5 , 667 (Utah App.
1990). However, as an exception the general rule, a statute is applied retroactively
where it changes only procedural law by providing a different mode for enforcing
substantive rights:
[Procedural statutes enacted subsequent to the initiation
of a suit which do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy
vested or contractual rights apply not only to future
actions, but also to accrued and pending actions as well.
ld^, citing Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 4 5 0 , 455 (Utah 1983). An amendment to a
statute is a procedural change where it "merely affects the legal machinery by
which the parties enforce their rights under the contract, " kL citing Pilcher v.
State, 663 P.2d at 4 5 5 , "or simply clarifies the legislature's previous intentions."
Id.

The Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that an amendment to a statute

which changed and clarified a notice requirement was retroactive and applied to a
case then pending. Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 P.2d 144, 151 (Utah 1979).
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On its face, the amendment to § 35-1-43(4) U.C.A. was a clarification that
notice to the Commission was not required for an employer to make an effective
election to exclude an officer from the definition of "employee." The requirement
to give separate notice to the Commission has never served any purpose or even
been observed except as the Fund has notified the Commission by computer tape.
Even prior to the amendment, the Commission did not approve or disapprove
coverage of corporate officers. The Commission has used the computer tape only
as evidence of statutory compliance by the Fund. Clearly the procedure established
between the Fund and Commission recognizes that no separate notice be given
from an employer.
Therefore, the amendment to U.C.A. § 35-1-43(4) should be applied
retroactively. The Employer was only required to give notice to the Fund and the
alleged failure to give notice to the Commission did not make the Employer's
election to exclude Olsen ineffective.
III.
PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES THAT THE NOTICE BE RECOGNIZED AS EFFECTIVE.
A.

A Decision That Olsen Was an Employee for Workers Compensation
Purposes Would Create a Conflict Between the Fund and the Employer That
Would be Contrary to Public Policy.
The Commission's decision should not be set aside for public policy reasons.

A decision to the contrary would be to interfere with the contractual relationship
between the Fund and the Employer. The insurance policy between the Fund and
the Employer creates a "duty [of the Fund] to defend at our expense any claim,
12

proceeding, or suit against the Employer for benefits payable by this insurance."
(Policy, Coverage A, Record at p. 6 9 , See Addendum.) The Utah Supreme Court
has ruled that this duty requires the insurer to "be as zealous in protecting the
interests of the insured as it would be in regard to its own." Beck v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 701 P.2d 7 9 5 , 799 (Utah 1985); citing Lvon v. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co., 25 Utah 2d 3 1 1 , 3 1 9 , 4 8 0 P.2d 7 3 9 , 745 (1971).
If Olsen were found to be an employee, rather than guarding the interests of
the Employer, the Fund would be placed in the position of having to challenge the
Employer as to whether the policy of insurance covered Olsen. Being a covered
employee and an insured employee are two different considerations. It does not
necessarily follow that the Employer had insurance for Olsen.
An employer has the option of buying insurance or, if qualfied, being selfinsured for its liability for employees' workers compensation benefits. If the
employer fails to insure or qualify for self-insurance, it is liable for tort remedies as
well as compensation benefits. U.C.A. § 35-1-57. The question of whether an
employee is insured is a matter of contract between the insurer and the employer.
Because the Fund relied on the Employer's notice that Olsen was to be excluded
from coverage under the policy, it would have to take the position that Olsen was
an uninsured employee and Applicant must look only to the Employer and not the
Fund for the claimed benefits. Such a dispute would put the Fund in conflict with
its duty to Employer which is contrary to public policy.

13

B.

A Finding That the Established Notice Procedure is Ineffective Would Create
Chaos With Regard to Coverage With All Corporate Employers Which Elected
Not to Cover Officers.
A decision against The Fund and the Commission would also create a

potentially wide-spread chaotic situation regarding the exposure of the Fund to
claims of any insured which had not given the required notice. To protect against a
new area of risk without having provided actuarially determined reserves, the Fund
would have to attempt to collect premiums from all such employers retroactively
since it relied on the established notice procedure to reduce premiums. Even
though the Fund has retroactively assessed premiums in the past, the public will
not be served if the Fund, which insures over 2 6 , 5 0 0 employers, most of which
are small companies, is required to identify all employers which have elected out of
coverage for officers and directors and then attempt to assess premiums
retroactively to cover its risk. Such a result has the potential to tie up significan
amounts of court time, would be inequitable to all employers who acted in good
faith in giving notice through the established procedure, and is contrary to public
policy.
CONCLUSION
The well-established and long-observed method of transmitting notice of the
Employer's election to exclude workers compensation coverage for officers and
directors meets the requirements of U.C.A § 35-1-43(3)(b). In the alternative, the
provisions of the revised notice requirement, U.C.A § 35-1-43(4) which eliminates
any notice to the Commission should be applied retroactively to deny Petitioner's
14

claimed benefits. If the notice was ineffective, it is equitable that the burden of
failing to properly exclude an officer of the company from coverage as an employee
for workers compensation purposes should fall on the Employer who had the duty
to give proper notice to the required parties. The Employer, not the Fund, was in
the best position to see that the notice burden was satisfied. This is especially true
in the present case where Olsen himself was the person who personally requested
that he be dropped from coverage; where he signed two documents to that effect;
and, where he was also the president of the company and an attorney who is
presumed to know the law.
The Fund asks the Court to affirm the decision of the Commission that
neither the Employer nor the Fund are liable for the claimed compensation, and for
such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper under the
circumstances.
DATED t h i s J ^ ^ d a y o f x ^ 5 ^ ^ ^ £ ,

1996.

^kjU^f

raid J. Lc
DREDGE & LALLATIN, L C .
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
instrument was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this ^5"7>> day of^g/vI^r^K.
1996 to the following:
Eugene Miller
Attorney at Law
311 South State, Suite 240
Salt Lake City, UT84111
Attorney for Applicant

Attorney for Respondents
gal\dlsen3.brf

16

ADDENDUM
1.

AFFIDAVIT OF BRAD CHRISTENSEN,

2.

POLICY, COVERAGE A, Record at p. 69.

3.

GENERAL ENDORSEMENT, Record at p. 7 1 .
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Record at pp. 37-38.

JANET L. MOFFITT, No. 2287
Attorney for Defendants
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8149

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

JUDEAN S. OLSEN, Widow of
GREGORY J. OLSEN, Deceased

*
*
*

Applicant,
*

v
COMPANY
and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF
UTAH,
Defendants.

*
*

AFFIDAVIT OF
BRAD CHRISTENSON

*

Case No. 95-182

*

*

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

I, BRAD CHRISTENSON, having been duly sworn upon oath, does depose and say:
1. That I am employed by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah with offices at 392 East
6400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84107, telephone number 288-8077.
2.

That in connection with my employment, I have access to and am familiar with the

preparation of weekly computer tapes sent to the Industrial Commission and that said tapes contain all
transactional information and coverage alterations concerning individual policyholders.

0003*

3. That information concerning the deletion of coverage for corporate officers for Samuel
Mclntyre Investments was received by the Workers Compensation Fund and entered into the computer
on March 30, 1993.
4. That a copy of the computer tape containing 'he deletion information was provided to the
Industrial Commission in the tape transmitted during the week following the entry.
5. That the same information has been transmitted on a repeated basis to the Industrial
Commission via the weekly tape thereafter.
DATED

this / %

day of

Je^c/si^

—

1995.

BRAD CHRISTENSON

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /±_ day of September, 1995/

N6JTXRY PUBLIC

/ ^

Residing in:

-2*/w«JO£

12/06/1995

12:09

8812888038

WORKERS COMPENSATION
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IMPORTANT — PLEASE READ YOUR POLICY and become thoroughly familiar with its
provisions. A few moments attention right now may save misunderstanding in the future.
This policy is a contract of insurance between the Employer
nsteo on tne aeciaration page and trie Workers Compensation
Fund ot Ulan, neremarter reierred to as the -Fund." Tne only
agreements relating to this insurance are stated in this policy.
The terms of this policy may not be changed or waived except

by endorsement issued by the Fund to be part of this policy.
In return for the payment ot the premium and subject to all the
terms ot this policy, the Fund agrees with the employer as
follows:

COVERAGE A
WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE COVERAGE
The Fund does hereby agree with the Employer named on the
declaration page to insure the employer against liability for
compensation under the Utah Wortcmen's Compensation Act
and the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law. as provided
in Chapters 1.2. and 3 of Title 35. Utah Code Annotated 1953.
and alt amenoments thereto and other relevant Utah statutes.
including liability to pay for medical and other treatment and
care of injured employees as required by said Acts. Workmen's
compensation acts and laws from jurisdictions other tnan the
State ot Utah shall not govern this policy.
This woncers Compensation insurance applies to bodily injury
by accioent or bodily injury by disease as those terms are
detineo in the Utah Wornmen's Comoensatton Act. tne Utah
Occuoauonai Disease Disability Law. and by the Utah Supreme
Cotlrt Undilv i h m r v irwtiirt*« inn ins f * c n l h A n i n t a a t h

Astrfilw

injury by accident must occur during the policy penod. Bodily
injury by disease must be caused, or aggravate^ by the
conditions of employment (See Sec 35*2-1. et seq. Utah Code
Annotated). The employee's last injurious exposure to the
conditions giving rise to the ciaim must occur during tne policy
period.
The Fund will pay promptly, when due. the oenefits required by
the Utah workmen's Compensation Act and/or the Utah
Occupational Disease Disability Law. The Fund has me right
and duty to dofend at ogr expense any claim, proceeding, or suit
against the Employer for oenefits payable by this insurance. It is
specifically understood that the Fund nas the right to cnoose
counsel to represent the Employer in-any cause ot action
covered under this policy. The Fund has the right to investigate

12/G3/1995

m

Wmw*
J£ L

12:89

8812888838

WORKERS COMPENSATION

: *
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CC

Workers
Compensation
Fund of Utah

Safe and Sound Thiniting

GENERAL ENDORSEMENT
Date Issued: 01/30/95
Attention: WILLIAM QUINCY
SAMOEL MCINTYRE INVESTMENT CO
11009 ARCH TERRACE
AUSTIN TX 787S0

Policy NO: 1349373
Telephone No: (410)721-9171

THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES TOOK POLICY - PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY
Coverage has been added for GREGORY J OLSEN effective 9/19/1971. Coverage
will be discontinued 2/4/1992.
Coverage has been discontinued for GREGORY J OLSEN effective 2/4/1992.

: BNIBLSEN

